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INTRODUCTION
The American judicial system is an adversarial one, and its
fundamental operational rules are generally based on the
assumptions that the parties are represented by competent counsel,
∗
Appellate Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, United States Department
of Veterans Affairs; Secretary/Treasurer, The Edward Coke Appellate American Inn
of Court. The views expressed herein are the author’s and should not be attributed
to the Department of Veterans Affairs or any other person or organization.

1279

OCONNORJCI.DOC

1280

6/19/2001 10:50 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1279

the proceedings comport with the requirements of due process, and
the decisionmaker is fair and knowledgeable.1
In veterans benefits cases, however, the initial proceedings at the
agency level are informal and nonadversarial.2 Few claimants are
represented by attorneys at that level.3 Claimants who are not
represented by an attorney at the informal, nonadversarial agency
level often fail to raise issues that an attorney would have. When the
claimant files an appeal from an agency determination to the federal
appellate court, the proceedings become adversarial.4 Attorneys for
claimants often wish to raise issues on appeal that the claimant never
raised before the agency.
At this stage, the appellate court must balance competing and
often conflicting goals to determine whether it should address issues
raised for the first time on appeal. On the one hand, the claimant
has an interest in recognition of the informal, nonadversarial nature
of initial proceedings. On the other hand, federal appellate courts
usually do not consider an issue if a claimant failed to raise it before
the lower tribunal, on the ground that the claimant waived or failed
to exhaust administrative remedies with respect to that particular
issue.5
1. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1988) (“The paramount importance
of vigorous representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of
justice. . . . This system is premised on the well-tested principle that truth—as well as
fairness—is ‘best discovered by powerful statements on both sides of the question.’
. . . The need for forceful advocacy does not come to an abrupt halt as the legal
proceeding moves from the trial to appellate stage. Both stages of the prosecution,
although perhaps involving unique legal skills, require careful advocacy to ensure
that rights are not foregone and that substantial legal and factual arguments are not
inadvertently passed over.”) (quoting Kaufman, Does the Judge Have a Right to Qualified
Counsel?, 61 A.B.A. J. 569, 569 (1975) (quoting Lord Eldon)).
2. See BARTON F. STICHMAN, R ONALD B. ABRAMS & DAVID F. ADDLESTONE,
VETERANS BENEFITS M ANUAL ' 12.1.1, at 12-5 (1999) (noting that claims for veterans
benefits are initially filed at one of the fifty-eight VA regional offices); see also infra
notes 71-76 and accompanying text (explaining non-adversarial nature of veterans
benefits cases).
3. See infra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing statistics on attorney
representation).
4. See 38 U.S.C. ' 7252 (1994) (claimants can appeal agency decision to Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims); 38 U.S.C. ' 7263(a) (1994) (on appeal to Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, the agency is represented by the General Counsel of
the Department of Veterans Affairs); 38 U.S.C. ' 7263(b)-(d) (1994) (provisions for
representation of claimants before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
5. See Cedar Lumber, Inc. v. United States, 857 F.2d 765, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(citing the general rule that arguments not presented to the “initial adjudicatory
forum” are deemed waived on appeal); see also 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.8, at 341-44 (3d ed. 1994) (reviewing
cases standing for the proposition that a petitioner cannot raise an issue not
previously raised before the agency because a reviewing court would “usurp” that
agency’s power “to consider the matter, make [a] ruling, and state the reasons for its
action”).
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This Article focuses on the application of the doctrine of “issue
exhaustion”—that is, the requirement that a claimant raise a
particular legal issue before the agency-level adjudicator in order for
a reviewing court to consider the issue on appeal6—to veterans
benefits appeals. Part I discusses the federal benefits available to
veterans and their dependents. Part II outlines the claims and
appeals process in veterans benefits cases. Part III discusses the
conflicting goals of the veterans benefits appeals process. Part IV
traces the development of case law on issue exhaustion in veterans
benefits appeals. Part V explores the options available to the courts:
requiring issue exhaustion for all issues, not requiring issue
exhaustion for any issue, and requiring issue exhaustion for certain
types of issues, but not for other types of issues. This Article
concludes that requiring issue exhaustion for all issues or not
requiring it for any issue fails to balance the conflicting goals of the
veterans benefits appeals process.
Furthermore, this Article
advocates an approach which requires issue exhaustion for certain
issues, but not for other issues, because it strikes a better balance
between those conflicting goals than an “all or nothing” approach.
This Article contends that a rule-based approach is superior to a
case-by-case balancing approach for determining which issues should
require exhaustion. A case-by-case balancing approach is undesirable
because it tends to produce ad hoc, unprincipled, and unpredictable
decisions.7 Consequently, a rule-based approach predicated on the
types of rules and arguments asserted on appeal is the more
advantageous approach to this problem. Such an approach should
be based on an inquiry into what the lower tribunal did decide or
should have decided. Furthermore, the determination of what the
lower tribunal should have decided should be based on the evidence
and argument present in the record at the time the lower tribunal
rendered its decision.
I.

VETERANS BENEFITS

Various federal benefits are available to veterans and their
dependents through the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). A
6. See Sims v. Apfel, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000) (citing Hormel v. Helvering,
312 U.S. 552, 556 (1941)) (“Ordinarily an appellate court does not give
consideration to issues not raised below.”). See generally John C. Dubin, Torquemada
Meets Kafka: The Misapplication of the Issue Exhaustion Requirement to Inquisitorial
Administrative Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1289 (1997) (arguing that application of
formal issue exhaustion rules to Social Security benefits appeals and other informal
administrative proceedings significantly limits claimants’ judicial review rights).
7. See infra notes 213-18 and accompanying text.
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veteran may receive monthly compensation if he or she has a serviceconnected disability.8 To receive service connection for a disability,
there must be evidence that the veteran currently has a disability and
that the current disability is connected to a disease or injury incurred
while in service.9 Once the VA Regional Office grants service
connection for a particular disability, the amount of compensation
depends on the disability evaluation the Regional Office assigns. The
criteria for the disability evaluations for various disabilities are set
forth in the “Schedule for Rating Disabilities.”10 There are separate
criteria for distinct disabilities, and those criteria are listed under
“Diagnostic Codes” in the Schedule for Rating Disabilities.11
Compensable disability evaluations range, in 10% increments, from
10% to 100%. The percentage ratings represent the average
impairment in earning capacity resulting from the service-connected
disease or injury.12
A veteran can receive a 100% disability evaluation in two principal
ways. First, the veteran may meet the criteria for a 100% evaluation
for a particular disability.13 Second, even if the veteran does not meet
the criteria for a 100% evaluation for a particular disability, he or she
still may receive a 100% evaluation based on “individual
unemployability” if the veteran “presents evidence that he or she is
unable to secure or follow a substantially gainful occupation as a

8. Veterans benefits statutes are located at Title 38 of the United States Code.
Veterans benefits regulations are located at Title 38 of the Code of Federal
Regulations. See generally 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994) (providing for payment of
compensation for disability incurred in the line of duty during wartime); id. § 1131
(providing for payment of compensation for disability incurred in the line of duty
during peacetime).
9. Veterans benefits cases are reported in West’s Veterans Appeals Reporter,
abbreviated as “Vet. App.” See Caluza v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 498, 505 (1995)
(examining cases applying the general rule that “[s]ervice connection for VA
disability compensation purposes will be awarded to a veteran who served on active
duty . . . for any disease or injury that was incurred in or aggravated by a veteran’s
active service or for certain diseases that were initially manifested to a degree of 10%
or more within a specified presumption period after the date of separation from
service”), aff’d, 78 F.3d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
10. See generally 38 C.F.R. § 4 (1999) (establishing criteria for evaluating the level
of disability of veterans with disabilities).
11. See id.; see also id. § 4.27 (explaining the use of diagnostic code numbers to
represent the listed ratable disabilities); id. § 4, app. B (providing a numerical index
of diagnostic codes representing specific disabilities).
12. See 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1999) (explaining that the rating schedule is a guide in
the evaluation of disability where the degrees of disability specified are generally
adequate to compensate for considerable loss of working time from exacerbations or
illness proportionate to the severity of the several grades of disability).
13. See, e.g., id. § 4.71a, Diagnostic Code 5285 (providing a 100% evaluation for
residuals of fracture of a spinal vertebra with cord involvement, either bedridden or
requiring long leg braces).
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result of a service-connected disability.”14
If a veteran is disabled, but the disability is not connected to a
disease or injury incurred in service, he or she may still be eligible for
non-service-connected pension benefits.15 To receive non-serviceconnected pension benefits, a veteran must have had ninety or more
days of active service during a period of war, meet certain income
requirements, and be unable to work because of a permanent
disability.16
VA benefits are also available to certain spouses and dependents of
veterans. If a veteran dies from a service-connected disability, his or
her spouse or dependents are eligible for Dependency and
Indemnity Compensation (“DIC”) benefits.17 DIC benefits are also
available in some cases when a veteran is totally disabled due to a
service-connected disability at the time of death, even if the death was
not due to the service-connected disability.18
Many other VA benefits, including health-care benefits,
educational benefits, vocational rehabilitation, home loan guaranties,
life insurance, and burial benefits, are available to veterans.19 The
vast majority of appeals in veterans benefits cases, however, concern
entitlement to compensation for service-connected disabilities, nonservice-connected pensions, and DIC benefits.20
II. THE VETERANS BENEFITS C LAIMS AND APPEALS PROCESS
In order to obtain veterans benefits, the person seeking the
benefits must first file a claim with the VA Regional Office.21 After
14. Id. § 4.16. See generally id. § 4.15 (granting total disability when an
impairment renders it impossible for the average person to follow a substantially
gainful occupation and the impairment is certain to continue throughout the life of
the disabled person); id. § 4.16 (granting total disability based on the
unemployability of the individual).
15. See 38 U.S.C. § 1521 (1994) (providing for payment of a pension to a veteran
who is permanently and totally disabled from non-service-connected disability not
the result of willful misconduct and who meets the service requirement).
16. See Vargas-Gonzalez v. West, 12 Vet. App. 321, 328 (1999) (enumerating the
factors for establishing entitlement to non-service-connected pension benefits).
17. See 38 U.S.C. § 1310 (1994) (stating that benefits will be paid to the surviving
spouse, children, and parents when any veteran dies after December 31, 1956, from a
service-connected or compensable disability).
18. See id. § 1318. The survivor is eligible if the veteran was rated totally disabled
(i.e., a 100% evaluation) for ten years or more before death, or for at least five years
following discharge from service. See id.
19. See generally DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, FEDERAL BENEFITS FOR
VETERANS AND DEPENDENTS (1999) (providing a detailed overview of benefits available
to veterans); see also generally KEITH D. SNYDER & RICHARD E. O’DELL , VETERANS
BENEFITS: THE C OMPLETE G UIDE (1990) (same).
20. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text (citing statistics for veterans
benefits cases).
21. See 38 U.S.C. § 5101(a) (1994).
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the appropriate development22 of the claim, the Regional Office then
makes a decision, usually referred to as a “rating decision.”23 Once
the Regional Office has rendered a decision regarding a claim that is
adverse to the claimant, the claimant may appeal to the Board of
Veterans’ Appeals (“Board”).24
The Board is part of the Department of Veterans Affairs.25
President Roosevelt created the Board in 1933 by executive order.26
In 1999, there were sixty-one Board members, all of whom were
attorneys.27 Decisions are made by a single Board member.28 In fiscal
year 1999, the Board issued 37,373 decisions.29 Approximately ninetythree percent of those decisions concerned claims for compensation
for service-connected disabilities by veterans or dependents.30 Nonservice-connected pension claims accounted for another three
percent.31
In 1999, approximately five percent of claimants appealing to the
Board were represented by attorneys.32 However, about eighty-four
percent of claimants were represented by veterans service
organizations, such as The American Legion33 and Disabled American
Veterans.34 Veterans service organization staff members, who usually
22. In veterans benefits cases “development” or fulfillment of the “duty to assist”
is roughly analogous to discovery in civil cases. That is, it is the process of gathering
evidence before a decision is made. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
23. The agency must give a claimant timely notice of a decision affecting the
provision of benefits. See 38 U.S.C. § 5104 (1994). The notice must include an
explanation of the procedure for obtaining review of the decision and in cases where
a benefit is denied, it must also include a statement of the reasons for the decision
and a summary of the evidence considered. See id.
24. See id. § 7104(a) (providing that all questions in a matter shall be subject to
one review on appeal to the Secretary and final decisions on such appeal shall be
made by the Board); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.101 (1999) (outlining the jurisdiction of
the Board).
25. See REPORT OF THE C HAIRMAN, BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS, FISCAL YEAR 1999,
at 1 (1999) [hereinafter CHAIRMAN’ S REPORT].
26. See id. at 1-2.
27. See id. at 20-21.
28. See id. at 8-9.
29. See id. at 31.
30. See id. (reporting 34,739 decisions in the “compensation” category).
31. See id. (reporting 1,260 decisions in the “pension” category).
32. See id. at 32.
33. See id. (representing 22.5% of claimants in 1999). The American Legion is a
community service organization of war-time veterans. See The American Legion: The
American Legion Organization, at http://www.legion.org./backfact.htm (last modified
Jan. 4, 2000). The Veterans Affairs and Rehabilitation Commission of the American
Legion oversees federally mandated programs provided by the Department of
Veterans Affairs for veterans and their dependents. See id.
34. See CHAIRMAN’ S REPORT, supra note 25, at 32 (representing 33.6% of claimants
in 1999). Disabled American Veterans is a nationwide organization that provides a
network of services to veterans and their families. See DAV: Background Information on
the Disabled American Veterans, at http://www.dav.org/about (last visited Apr. 18,
2000).
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are not attorneys, represent claimants without charge.35 About ten
percent of claimants were unrepresented before the Board.36
The first step in the appeals process is the filing of a timely “Notice
of Disagreement” by the claimant.37 A Notice of Disagreement is “[a]
written communication from a claimant or his or her representative
expressing dissatisfaction with an adjudicative determination by the
agency of original jurisdiction and a desire to contest the result.”38
The claimant must file the Notice of Disagreement within one year of
the agency’s mailing of notice of the decision to be appealed.39 The
filing of a timely Notice of Disagreement is a jurisdictional
requirement for obtaining appellate review.40
After the claimant has filed a Notice of Disagreement,
responsibility shifts to the VA Regional Office to issue a “Statement of
the Case.”41 The Statement of the Case must contain a summary of
the evidence in the case pertinent to the issue or issues with which
disagreement has been expressed; a citation to pertinent laws and
regulations; a discussion of how those laws and regulations affect the
agency’s decision; a decision on each issue; and a summary of the
reasons for the decision.42 The purpose of the Statement of the Case
is to frame the issues for appeal and assist the claimant in preparing
arguments to the Board.43
35. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782,
5794-95 (“[T]he major veterans service organizations also furnish claims assistance by
trained specialists at no charge.”), quoted in Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
36. See CHAIRMAN’ S REPORT, supra note 25, at 32.
37. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (1994) (establishing the requirements for filing a Notice
of Disagreement and appeal). Appellate review of a claim is initiated by the filing of
a Notice of Disagreement followed by a statement of the case prepared by the agency
and is completed by a substantive appeal. See id.
38. 38 C.F.R. § 20.201 (1999).
39. See id. § 20.302 (“Except in the case of simultaneously contested claims, a
claimant, or his or her representative, must file a Notice of Disagreement with a
determination by the agency of original jurisdiction within one year from the date
that that agency mails notice of the determination to him or her.”); see also 38 U.S.C.
§ 7105(b)(1) (1994) (“A notice of disagreement postmarked before the expiration of
the one-year period will be accepted as timely filed.”).
40. See Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 402, 102 Stat.
4105 (1988) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7105 (1994)) (stating that an agency’s action or
determination will become final if no Notice of Disagreement is filed within the
proscribed period and the claim will not thereafter be reopened except as otherwise
allowed by the regulations).
41. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1) (1994) (describing the procedure for filing of
Notice of Disagreement and appeal); 38 C.F.R. § 19.26 (1999) (requiring the agency
to reexamine the claim, take additional development or review action as it deems
proper, and prepare a Statement of the Case).
42. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(1) (1994) (establishing the elements required in the
Statement of the Case); 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (1999) (same).
43. See 38 C.F.R. § 19.29 (1999) (“The Statement of the Case must be complete
enough to allow the appellant to present written and/or oral arguments before the
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After the Regional Office issues the Statement of the Case, the
claimant must then file a Substantive Appeal.44 In the Substantive
Appeal, the claimant “should set out specific allegations of error of
fact or law, [and] such allegations [should be] related to specific
items in the statement of the case. The benefits sought on appeal
must be clearly identified.”45
After the claimant files the Substantive Appeal, the Board must
then render a decision.46 In rendering its decision, the Board is
required to provide “a written statement of its findings and
conclusions, and the reasons or bases for those findings and
conclusions, on all material issues of fact and law presented on the
record.”47
Prior to 1988, there was no judicial review of the decisions of the
Board.48 In 1988, the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act49 created the
Court of Veterans Appeals, a seven-member Article I court.50 On
Board of Veterans’ Appeals.”).
44. See 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (1994) (affording the claimant sixty days from the
date the Statement of the Case is mailed to file a formal appeal); 38 C.F.R. § 20.202
(1999) (“An appeal consists of a timely filed Notice of Disagreement in writing and,
after a Statement of the Case has been furnished, a timely filed Substantive
Appeal.”); see also id. (“Proper completion and filing of a Substantive Appeal are the
last actions the appellant needs to take to perfect an appeal.”).
45. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202 (1999).
46. See id. § 20.200.
47. 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (1994).
48. See Hamilton v. Brown, 39 F.3d 1574, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Effective
September 1, 1989, Congress established the Court of Veterans Appeals to provide
for the first time a judicial appeals process to be utilized in veterans benefits
matters.”); see also WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS
APPEALS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE, ORGANIZATION, AND OPERATION OF THE
NEWEST ARTICLE ONE COURT 3-11 (2d ed. 1998) (discussing judicial review of veterans
benefits claims prior to 1988).
49. See Veterans' Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 301, 102 Stat.
4105 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §§ 4051-4092 (1994)); see also FOX, supra note
48, at 13-27.
50. See Bailey v. West, 160 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (referring to the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims as an Article I court).
Prior to the enactment of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act, an attorney or agent
was proscribed, under threat of fine and imprisonment, from charging a claimant of
veterans benefits more than $10 for representation before the Department of
Veterans Affairs or the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. See In re Wick, 40 F.3d 367, 369
(Fed. Cir. 1994); see also Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S.
305, 307 (1985) (upholding the constitutionality of the then-existing fee limitation
on veterans’ attorneys or agents). With the passage of the Veterans’ Judicial Review
Act in 1988, Congress repealed the $10 fee limitation and permitted claimants to
enter into fee agreements with attorneys and agents representing them, provided the
agreement met specific requirements. See Wick, 40 F.2d at 369 (citing 38 U.S.C.
§ 5904). The Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992 extended Equal Access to
Justice Act coverage to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. See Federal Courts
Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 506, 106 Stat. 4506 (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(f) (1994)); see also Cook v. Brown, 68 F.3d 447, 451 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (concluding that “attorney fees” do not include fees for non-attorney
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March 1, 1999, the name of the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals was changed to the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims.51 This Article will refer to that court as the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (or “CAVC”).
Article I courts, or “legislative” courts, are created under Article I,
section 8 of the Constitution.52 Article III courts, or “constitutional”
courts, are created under Article III, section 1.53 Article I courts
include the Tax Court, the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of
Military Appeals, as well as the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.54
Courts have interpreted the powers of an Article I court to be
“limited by what it has been given it by specific acts of Congress and
by its own rules adopted pursuant to Congressional authority.”55
If the Board renders an adverse decision, the claimant may either
file a motion for reconsideration with the Chairman of the Board56 or
file a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.57
The agency may not seek review of a Board decision.58
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’ review is “on the record
of proceedings before the Secretary and the Board” and the court has
the power “to affirm, modify, or reverse a decision of the Board or to
remand the matter, as appropriate.”59 Initial decisions are usually
made by a single judge.60 A party, however, may move for panel
practitioners who are not licensed to practice law in other courts but are allowed to
practice before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims).
51. See Veterans Programs Enhancement Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 511,
112 Stat. 3315, 3341 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 7251) (noting the change of the court’s
name).
52. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT , THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 11 (5th ed. 1994)
(discussing the development of legislative courts as well as the confusion and
controversy created by the distinction between “constitutional” and “legislative”
courts).
53. See id. (“Article III, § 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The Judicial Power of
the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts
as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.’”).
54. See id. at 56 (listing the “legislative” courts created pursuant to Article I of the
Constitution and noting that the Court of Military Appeals is not part of the judiciary
at all but is a military tribunal created by the Article I power to make rules for the
government and regulate land and naval forces).
55. In re United States, 877 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
56. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1000 (1999) (granting the ability to seek reconsideration by
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals on motion by the appellant or on the Board’s own
motion).
57. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252 (1994) (granting exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims to review decisions of the Board); id. § 7261(a)(l)
(establishing the Court’s scope of review to decide all relevant questions of law,
interpret constitutional, statutory and regulatory decisions, and determine the
applicability or meaning of the terms of an action by the Secretary).
58. 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1994).
59. Id.; see also id. § 7261 (granting power to the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims to hold unlawful and set aside findings if clearly erroneous).
60. See FOX, supra note 48, at 22 (noting that approximately 80% of cases are
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(three-judge)61 or full court (seven-judge)62 consideration. A party
may also move for reconsideration.63
If the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims makes an adverse
decision, review is available by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.64 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is
a relatively new court. The court was created in 1982 and was
originally given appellate jurisdiction over the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.65 Congress has limited the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over decisions of the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims to those appeals that challenge the validity of any
statute or regulation or any interpretation of a statute or regulation.66
An issue otherwise within the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction must, in
addition, be one upon which the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims relied in making its decision.67 Either the agency or the
claimant may seek review in the Federal Circuit.68 The Supreme
Court may review the Federal Circuit’s decision.69 To date, the
Supreme Court has only granted certiorari in one case. 70
This Article will focus on the arguments a claimant must make to
the agency, i.e., the Board, in order to be able to properly raise those
arguments before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims.

decided by a single judge).
61. See U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(b) (“A party in a case decided by a single judge may
move for review by a panel of the Court.”).
62. See U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(c) (“A party may move for initial consideration of a
case, or for review of a panel decision in a case, by the full Court.”).
63. See U.S. VET. APP. R. 35(a) (providing that “[s]uch a motion must be made
within 14 days after the date of the decision of which reconsideration is being
requested”).
64. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292 (1994).
65. See WRIGHT, supra note 52, § 5, at 17 (describing the functions of the two
separate courts before their merger in 1982).
66. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a) (1994) (stating that the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit’s review of a decision will be to the extent the issue is presented and
necessary to a decision); see also id. § 7292(d)(1) (“The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit shall decide all relevant questions of law, including interpreting
constitutional and statutory provisions.”).
67. Id. § 7292(a). Review may be sought on issues considered by the United
States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims in making its decision other than a
refusal to review the schedule of ratings for disabilities or a determination as to a
factual matter. See id.
68. See id. The Secretary may not appeal a Board decision. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
69. See 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1994).
70. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115 (1994) (affirming the Federal Circuit’s
interpretation of 38 U.S.C. § 1151 for purposes of liability for a veteran’s claim of
disability after VA treatment).
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III. CONFLICTING GOALS IN THE VETERANS BENEFITS APPEALS PROCESS
Congress designed the veterans benefits system to be
nonadversarial and to favor veterans.71 All three courts that decide
veterans benefits cases recognize this basic premise. The Supreme
Court has observed that “surely Congress desired that the
proceedings be as informal and nonadversarial as possible.”72 The
Supreme Court has also noted that in construing statutes,
interpretive doubt is to be resolved in favor of the veteran.73
The Federal Circuit has described the veterans benefits system as
“uniquely pro-claimant”74 and as “a nonadversarial, ex parte,
paternalistic system.”75 The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has
indicated that “it is well established that the VA adjudication process
is a non-adversarial one.”76
Although agency-level adjudications are non-adversarial, appellate
adjudications in the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims are
adversarial.77 And one of the general rules in federal appellate courts
is that a claimant is expected to raise an issue before the lower
tribunal before raising that issue on appeal. One of the leading
scholars of administrative law, Professor Kenneth Davis, has stated, in
discussing issues not raised before an administrative agency, that
“[m]any cases support the proposition that ‘[a] reviewing court
usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside the administrative
determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and
deprives the [agency] of an opportunity to consider the matter, make
its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.’”78 Professor Davis also
71. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 13 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782,
5794-95.
72. Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 323-24 (1985).
This decision predates the passage of the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act in 1988,
which created the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims. See supra notes 48 through
51 and accompanying text.
73. See Gardner, 513 U.S. at 117-18 (citing King v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 502 U.S.
215, 220-21 n.9 (1991)).
74. Hodge, 155 F.3d at 1363 (noting that the system of awarding compensation in
the context of veterans benefits is so uniquely pro-claimant that systemic fairness and
the appearance of fairness are important).
75. Collaro v. West, 136 F.3d 1304, 1309-10 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (crediting the
veterans benefits’ nonadversarial, paternalistic system as the reason for its conclusion
that veteran’s Notice of Disagreement was adequate).
76. Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69, 75 (1995) (quoting 38 C.F.R. § 20.700(c)
(1994)) (further noting that VA proceedings are not “limited by legal rules of
evidence”).
77. See 38 U.S.C. § 7263 (1994) (designating the representation of the Secretary
and appellants).
78. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 15.8, at 341 (quoting Unemployment Comp.
Comm’n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 155 (1946)). See, e.g., Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 902 (1988) (referring to Professor Davis as “a widely respected
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indicated that it is “[v]ery common” to find statements in appellate
decisions such as, “in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, a
reviewing court will refuse to consider contentions not presented
before the administrative proceeding . . . at the appropriate time.”79
This proposition is similar to the general rule that appellate courts
will not entertain arguments that could have been, but were not,
raised in the trial court.80
According to Professor Davis, this “exhaustion” doctrine serves
several important functions.
First, and most important, the
legislature creates an agency for the purpose of applying a statutory
scheme to particular factual situations.81 The exhaustion doctrine
permits the agency to perform this function, including, in particular,
the opportunity for the agency to find facts, apply its expertise, and
exercise the discretion granted it by the legislature.82 Second, it is
more efficient to permit the administrative process to proceed
uninterrupted and to subject the results of the process to judicial
review only at the conclusion of the process than to permit judicial
intervention at each phase of the process.83 Third, agencies are not
part of the judicial branch; they are autonomous entities created by
the legislature to perform a particular function.84 The exhaustion
doctrine protects that agency autonomy. Fourth, judicial review of
agency action can be hindered by failure to exhaust administrative
remedies because the agency may not have had an adequate
opportunity to assemble and to analyze relevant facts and to explain
the basis for its action.85 Fifth, the exhaustion requirement reduces
court appeals by providing the agency additional opportunities to
correct its prior errors.86 Sixth, allowing some parties to obtain court
review without first exhausting administrative remedies may reduce
the agency’s effectiveness, both by encouraging others to circumvent
its procedures and by rendering the agency’s enforcement efforts

administrative law scholar”); United States v. Deitz, 991 F.2d 443, 449 (8th Cir. 1993)
(referring to Professor Davis as the “dean of administrative law scholars”).
79. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, ' 15.8, at 342 (quoting Duncanson-Harrelson
Co. v. Director, OWCP, 644 F.2d 827, 832 (9th Cir. 1981)).
80. See Department of Pub. Welfare v. Secretary of Agric., 984 F.2d 514, 523 (1st
Cir. 1993) (“In the usual administrative law case, a court ought not to consider points
which were not seasonably raised before the agency.”).
81. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, ' 15.2, at 309 (citing McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969)).
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id.
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more complicated and more expensive.87
An additional function of the issue exhaustion doctrine may be
added to Professor Davis’ list, based on the nature or function of an
appellate court. Appeals are needed, as the great Roman jurist
Ulpian wrote in the third century, because they “correct the
unfairness or unskillfulness of those who adjudicate.”88 The principal
function of an appellate court is to correct errors of “those who
adjudicate”—that is, errors of the lower tribunal.89 “Error” can only
be understood in light of what an appellate court may expect from a
lower tribunal, or what a lower tribunal should have done in deciding
the case. In other words, “error” consists of the lower tribunal failing
to do something it should have. As Judge Farley stated in a decision
in the first year of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims’
operation, “[t]his Court is a court of review and our jurisdiction is
derivative; we can review only what was—or should have been—
decided below.”90
What should an appellate court be able to expect from a lower
tribunal? What “skillfulness” should “those who adjudicate” be
87. See id.
88. ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 3 (1941) (citing DIG.
49.1.1.pr. (Ulpian, De Appellationibus 1)). See 4 T HE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN 864
(Theodor Mommsen et al. eds., 1985) (translating “cum iniquitatem iudicantium uel
imperitiam recorrigat” as “it corrects the partiality or inexperience of judges”).
Ulpian, or Domitius Ulpianus, was a jurist of the early third century A.D. Bruce
W. Frier, Law on the Installment Plan, 82 M ICH. L. REV. 856, 856 (1984) (reviewing
TONY HONORÉ, ULPIAN (1982)). Approximately two-fifths of Justinian’s Digest is
attributed to him. Id. A Roman-law scholar writes that “the Digest is by far the most
influential work in Western legal history; then through the Digest, Ulpian has a fair
claim to being the most influential of all jurisprudents in that long and distinguished
tradition.” Id.
89. See Stuckey v. West, 13 Vet. App. 163, 168-69 (1999) (“The role of this Court
is to correct errors of the Board.”); cf. Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 988-89 (1983)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“If appellate review is to be meaningful, it must fulfill its
basic historic function of correcting error in the trial court proceedings. A review for
correctness reinforces the authority and acceptability of the trial court’s decision and
controls the adverse effects of any personal shortcomings in the initial
decisionmaker.”); P OUND, supra note 88, at 3 (noting that appellate proceedings have
a “double function of correction and prevention”); Edward H. Cooper, Civil Rule
52(a): Rationing and Rationalizing the Resources of Appellate Review, 63 N OTRE DAME L.
REV. 645, 649 (1988) (noting that “the federal courts of appeals serve two functions:
the correction of error in individual cases and the development of the law in ways
that will guide future conduct and future litigation”); The Honorable Joseph R.
Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U. L. REV. 237, 239
(1982) (“Appellate courts generally have two functions: first, they correct errors
committed during trial proceedings, thereby guaranteeing fair and just results to the
litigants; second, appellate courts further institutional goals of the judicial system
by . . . enunciating the law, clarifying the law, and, on occasion, promulgating new
rules of law.”).
90. Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 267, 275 (1991) (further noting that the
court’s first determination is whether the Board “adequately addressed and resolved
the issue raised by appellant or whether a remand is required”).
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expected to have? This Article contends that the lower tribunal
should be expected to apply the basic settled case law and statutory
and regulatory provisions governing the agency, to the extent that
they are raised by the record and a claimant’s argument and
testimony. In other words, the lower tribunal’s decision should be
judged in light of the evidence and argument presented before the
tribunal, as well as the settled agency-administered law in existence at
the time of the decision.91
The agency should not be expected to anticipate all possible
challenges a claimant’s counsel could make based on authority other
than the agency-specific statutes and regulations. Nor should it be
expected to, sua sponte, challenge the settled rules applicable to the
agency.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CASE LAW ON ISSUE EXHAUSTION
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit
have issued conflicting decisions in addressing the matter of issue
exhaustion. The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims has repeatedly
stated that it does not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal.92 The court has noted that it has powers of review over Board
decisions before it, not powers of first impression.93 The court has
also stated that, “[a]s a court of review, our task is to review [Board]
decisions based upon the record before the [Board], not to consider
for the first time defenses, contentions, or arguments which were not
91. See 38 U.S.C. § 7104(d)(1) (1994) (explaining that in rendering its decision,
the Board is required to provide “a written statement of its findings and conclusions,
and the reasons or bases for those findings and conclusions, on all material issues of
fact and law presented on the record”). This requirement is part of VA regulations.
See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 3.103(a) (1999) (VA has an “obligation . . . to render a decision
which grants every benefit that can be supported in law while protecting the interests
of the Government”); 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (1999) (noting the policy of the
Department of Veterans Affairs to “administer the law under a broad and liberal
interpretation consistent with the facts of each individual case”).
92. See, e.g., Richards v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 255, 257 (1996) (“Even more
conclusive, however, is the fact that this issue was not raised before the [Board], and
is therefore not properly before the Court.”); Horowitz v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 217,
225 (1993) (“However, appellant raises the ‘due process’ argument for the first time
here in this Court. A claimant seeking to appeal an issue to the Court must first
obtain a final [Board] decision on that issue.”); Talon v. Derwinski, 3 Vet. App. 74, 74
(1992) (“This issue, raised for the first time in this appeal, cannot be considered by
the Court . . . .”).
93. See Talbert v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 352, 356-57 (1995) (explaining that “the
‘liberal reading’ requirement does not require the Board to conduct an exercise in
prognostication, but only requires that it consider all issues reasonably raised by the
appellant’s substantive appeal”); Smith v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 267, 275 (1991)
(“This Court is a court of review and our jurisdiction is derivative; we can review only
what was—or should have been—decided below.”); see also supra note 92 and
accompanying text.
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raised before the Board.”94
In other cases, however, the court has stated that the Board is
required to consider a well-grounded claim95 for VA benefits under all
applicable provisions of law and regulation, even if the claimant did
not specifically raise the applicable provision.96 The court has
reasoned that to require veterans to specify which sections are
applicable to their request for benefits would mean that veterans
would have to be well versed in veterans benefits laws and regulations
before receiving compensation.97 The court further noted that such
a “fundamental change” could only be made by the legislative
94. Manio v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 140, 144 (1991) (stating that the court’s
jurisdiction is only over decisions issued by the Board).
95. Before November 2000, the concept of a “well-grounded” claim was
important in veterans benefits law because courts had held that the agency’s “duty to
assist” was not triggered unless the claimant had submitted a well-grounded claim.
See 38 U.S.C. § 5107(a) (1994) (“[A] person who submits a claim for benefits under a
law administered by the Secretary shall have the burden of submitting evidence . . .
that the claim is well grounded[.]”); Epps v. Gober, 126 F.3d 1464, 1468 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (concluding that under section 5107(a), the VA has a duty to assist only those
claimants who have established well-grounded claims), cert. denied sub nom. Epps v.
West, 524 U.S. 940 (1998).
The “duty to assist” includes, in appropriate
circumstances, conducting a medical examination, the reading of an appellant’s
claim documents in a liberal manner, and the gathering of evidence from VA, Social
Security Administration, and private records. See Robinette v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 69,
76 (1995). Recent legislation has broadened the agency’s duty to assist and
eliminated the requirement of submitting a well-grounded claim before the agency
has a duty to assist. See Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-475,
114 Stat. 2096.
Well-groundedness was a legal question whether, assuming the credibility of the
evidence in favor of the claimant, there was sufficient competent evidence on the key
elements of that particular claim. See Robinette, 8 Vet. App. at 75 (noting that for the
purpose of determining whether a claim is well-grounded, the credibility of the
evidence in support of the claim is presumed, and the determination is subject to de
novo review).
A well-grounded service-connection claim generally required a medical diagnosis
of a current disability; medical, or in certain circumstances, lay evidence of in-service
incurrence or aggravation of a disease or injury; and medical evidence of a nexus
between an in-service disease or injury and the current disability. See Epps, 126 F.3d
at 1468.
96. See Beaty v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 532, 536 (1994) (noting that the court has
held that the Board must consider a well-grounded claim regardless of whether the
claimant specifically raised the applicable provision of law or regulation). See, e.g.,
Mays v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 302, 305-06 (1993) (“[T]he Board is required to consider
a veteran’s claims under all applicable provisions of law and regulation whether or
not the claimant specifically raises the applicable provision.”); Hohol v. Derwinski, 2
Vet. App. 169, 173 (1992) (“We have invariably held that the BVA is not free to
ignore its own regulations, even if the appellant fails to raise the issue on appeal.”);
Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 308, 313 (1991) (“Even if not raised by appellant,
the Court has consistently ruled that the BVA is not free to ignore its own
regulations.”).
97. See Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118, 121 (1991) (noting that “the essence
of the VA system” is tied to the Secretary’s duty to ensure that each veteran is
informed of all benefits to which he is entitled; this “essence” is the non-adversarial
setting of the claims process).
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branch; it would be beyond the scope of the charter of the court itself
to make such a change.98
The Federal Circuit first considered issue exhaustion in Ledford v.
West.99 The Federal Circuit considered whether the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims erred in dismissing the part of the veteran’s
appeal that sought to challenge termination of his individual
unemployability benefits.100 In that case, the veteran’s benefits were
terminated based on an agency circular.101 The veteran argued that
the circular was invalid because it was not published in the Federal
Register or subject to notice and comment under the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), and the operation of the circular violated his
due process rights because it was inconsistent with a VA regulation
requiring clear and convincing evidence to reduce that benefit.102
The Federal Circuit concluded that the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims did not err in dismissing that part of the appeal.103 There were
two bases for the court’s holding, one jurisdictional and one nonjurisdictional.
First, the Federal Circuit held that, because the veteran did not file
a Notice of Disagreement with respect to the decision that terminated
his individual unemployability benefits, the court did not have
jurisdiction over that claim.104 Second, the court held that the veteran
had to exhaust his administrative remedies by presenting his
constitutional and APA challenges to the agency before presenting
them to a reviewing court.105 The Federal Circuit indicated that this
98. See id.
99. See 136 F.3d 776, 780 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also Dubin, supra note 6, at 1297
n.38 (noting in 1997 that the Federal Circuit had not yet addressed “issue
exhaustion” in veterans benefits cases).
100. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 778. Specifically, the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims found Ledford’s challenge to the 1981 rating decision to be a clear and
unmistakable error claim under 38 C.F.R. § 3.105(a) (1997). Because of this, the
court concluded that since this claim had not been raised before the Board, the
court lacked jurisdiction over the claim. See id.
101. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 777 (“In January 1981, the Seattle RO changed
[Ledford’s] rating to a 100% schedular rating pursuant to VA Circular 21-80-7, which
provided that ‘[a] 100% schedular evaluation will be assigned if unemployability is
directly attributable to a service-connected neuropsychiatric condition.’”).
102. See id. at 778; see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c) (1999) (cautioning that while
reducing a rating of 100% service-connected disability based on individual
unemployability is allowed, such a determination of employability must be
established by clear and convincing evidence).
103. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 782.
104. See id. at 779-80 (concluding that although legal reasoning supporting a
challenge need not be present in the Notice of Disagreement, it must mention a
disagreement with a specific determination; in this case, this requirement was not
satisfied with respect to the veteran’s claim).
105. See id. at 780 (“We agree with the government that, while the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is not jurisdictional, Ledford had to first
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requirement was “not jurisdictional” but nevertheless required it in
that case.106 The court rejected the veteran’s argument that
exhaustion was not required because the Board did not have the
power to invalidate the circular he challenged.107 The court noted
that a lack of agency power to provide a remedy concerning issues
beyond its charter “does not necessarily relieve a claimant from
presenting those issues as part of a challenge to an agency
decision.”108
The court reasoned that the veteran’s situation was similar to that
of the plaintiff in Aircraft & Diesel Corp. v. Hirsch.109 The Federal
Circuit quoted the Supreme Court’s reasoning in that case:
[I]n this case the very fact that constitutional issues are put forward
constitutes a strong reason for not allowing [a district court suit] to
anticipate or take the place of the Tax Court’s final performance of
its function. When that has been done, it is possible that nothing
will be left of appellant’s claim . . . .
The Tax Court may [likely] decide entirely in appellant’s favor . . .
For, apart from the questions of constitutionality and of the Tax
Court’s power to decide them finally or otherwise, appellant has
put forward . . . claims of exemption and noncoverage . . . . And if
those claims are well founded . . . the Tax Court’s determination of
these matters of coverage . . . well might render consideration of
the constitutional questions by it unnecessary and this cause
110
moot.

The Federal Circuit reasoned that the veteran argued that his
individual unemployability benefits were improperly terminated
under the circular in spite of a certain VA regulation; that the Board
is clearly empowered to determine which law applied to the facts
presented by the veteran and to apply that law; and that, had the
Board found the VA regulation to be applicable, the veteran might
have been provided with the remedy he sought, and the need for the
Board (and ultimately the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and
the Federal Circuit) to rule on the merits of his APA and
present his constitutional and APA challenges to the agency before presenting them
to the Court of Veteran Appeals.”).
106. See id.
107. See id. at 780-81 (“Ledford’s assertion that the agency cannot invalidate the
circular does not relieve him of the obligation of presenting his constitutional and
APA challenge to the agency.”).
108. Id. at 780.
109. 331 U.S. 752 (1947) (addressing the appeal of a dismissed suit by a
subcontractor for a declaratory judgment that the Renegotiations Acts were
unconstitutional).
110. Ledford, 136 F.3d at 781 (quoting Aircraft & Diesel, 331 U.S. at 772-73)
(footnotes and citations omitted).
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constitutional challenges might have been obviated.111 The court also
rejected his argument based on the legislative history of the Veterans’
Judicial Review Act, stating that “[t]he legislative history provides no
basis for us to conclude that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply here.”112
In a case that did not discuss exhaustion, Carbino v. West,113 the
Federal Circuit held that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
did not err in refusing to consider an argument raised for the first
time in a reply brief.114 The claimant had argued in his reply brief
before the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims that certain
provisions of an internal agency adjudication procedure manual were
“substantive rules” within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and thus had the “force and effect of law.”115 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims’ procedural rule was similar to the corresponding rule of the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 28(c).116 The court noted
that it had previously stated that under Rule 28(c), a reply brief
should “reply to the brief of the appellee” and “is not the appropriate
place to raise, for the first time, an issue for appellate review.”117
The court reasoned that “[t]here is substantial and well-established
precedent in other courts, as well, holding that issues initially raised
in a reply brief should not be entertained.”118 The court cited the
nature of the adversarial process as a reason for this rule:
111. See id. at 781-82 (addressing the Board’s “empowerment,” the court cited 38
C.F.R. § 19.5 (1997): “In the consideration of appeals, the Board is bound by
applicable statutes [and] regulations . . . The Board is not bound by Department
manuals, circulars, or similar administrative issues[.]”).
112. Id. at 782 (conceding that the legislative history does support Ledford’s
argument that Congress intended the Court of Veterans Appeals to have the power
to invalidate challenged regulations, but qualifying this concession with the fact that
the legislative history “does not speak to the question whether such a challenge
needs to be raised at the agency level in order to preserve it at the Court of Veterans
Appeals”).
113. 168 F.3d 32 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
114. See id. at 34 (“[T]he failure of an appellant to include an issue or argument in
the opening brief will be deemed a waiver of the issue or argument.”).
115. See infra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing how claimants
sometimes argue that the circular or agency manual in question, by virtue of the
Administrative Procedure Act, has the effect of a “substantive rule” with the “force
and effect of law,” which is what the claimant argued in Carbino).
116. See Carbino, 168 F.3d at 34; see also FED . R. APP. P. 28(c) (permitting an
appellant to file a brief in reply to the appellee’s brief).
117. Carbino, 168 F.3d at 34 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co.,
119 F.3d 1559, 1565-66 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Amhil Enters. Ltd. v. Wawa, Inc., 81 F.3d
1554, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
118. Carbino, 168 F.3d at 34 (citing Headrick v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272,
1277-78 (10th Cir. 1994); Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 932 n.14 (1st Cir. 1992);
Reynolds v. East Dyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1253 n.2 (7th Cir. 1989)).
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As the Tenth Circuit put it, permitting an appellant to raise new
arguments in a reply brief “would be unfair to the court itself,
which without the benefit of a response from appellee to an
appellant’s late-blooming argument, would run the risk ‘of an
improvident or ill-advised opinion, given [the court’s]
dependence . . .on the adversarial process for sharpening the issues
119
for decision.’”

In Stuckey v. West,120 the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
considered whether a claimant could raise constitutional and APA
challenges for the first time on appeal. The APA argument was the
same as the one raised in Carbino, that is, that certain provisions of an
internal agency adjudication procedure manual were “substantive
rules” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act, and
thus had the “force and effect of law.”121 The constitutional
argument, like the constitutional arguments in Ledford and Maggitt,122
was that the agency’s actions violated the Due Process Clause.123 The
court invited participation of amici, and most of the major veterans
service organizations submitted amicus briefs.124 The Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims considered the Federal Circuit’s Ledford
opinion, and held that it had jurisdiction “to review all challenges
and arguments relating to a particular claim, assuming all other
jurisdictional requirements were met.”125 The court indicated,
however, that it “generally will decline to exercise jurisdiction based
upon the doctrine of administrative exhaustion when the appellant
has failed to present those challenges and arguments, either expressly
119. Carbino, 168 F.3d at 35 (quoting Headrick v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d
1272, 1278 (10th Cir. 1994)). The court therefore concluded that “[a]n improper or
late presentation of an issue or argument under the court’s rules need not be
considered and, in fact, ordinarily should not be considered.” Id.
120. 13 Vet. App. 163 (1999).
121. See id. at 175; see also Carbino, 168 F.3d at 33 (noting Carbino’s claim that the
internal agency manual provisions did constitute binding substantive rules).
122. See infra notes 133-67 and accompanying text (discussing the cases of Maggitt
and Ledford).
123. See Stuckey, 13 Vet. App. at 176. The claimant argued, inter alia, that the VA
failed to notify him that it needed doctors’ statements directly addressing the issues
in his case, and that it would not accept hearsay. See id.
124. See id. at 165 (noting that the Paralyzed Veterans of America, the National
Organization of Veterans’ Advocates, the National Gulf War Resources Center, the
Disabled American Veterans, the Veterans of Foreign Wars, The American Legion,
and the National Veterans Legal Services Program participated as amici curiae). Four
of the amici curiae, The American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, Paralyzed
Veterans of America, and Veterans of Foreign Wars represented about two-thirds of
claimants before the Board in 1999. See C HAIRMAN’ S REPORT, supra note 25, at 32
(noting that the American Legion represented 22.5%, Disabled American Veterans
represented 33.6%, Paralyzed Veterans of America represented 2.2%, and Veterans
of Foreign Wars represented 8.6% of claimants).
125. Stuckey, 13 Vet. App. at 174.

OCONNORJCI.DOC

1298

6/19/2001 10:50 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1279

or implicitly, to the Board.”126 The court noted that there were
exceptions to this “general rule,” such as where the Board committed
a procedural error after the appellant filed his Notice of
Disagreement and Substantive Appeal, and “where the record on
appeal clearly and unmistakably present[ed] an issue to the Board.”127
The court recognized that “the adjudicative system established by
Congress and administered by the Secretary is meant to be strongly
pro-claimant” but noted that “this pro-claimant environment does
not leave us free to ignore statutes and implementing regulations
imposing duties on [the] claimant in defining their claims.”128 The
court stated that those provisions must be interpreted in a generous
manner to determine whether an issue was implied but, “we cannot
pretend that they do not exist nor can we, in the guise of
‘interpretation,’ repeal them.”129 The court observed that Congress
and the Secretary have provided for accredited representatives “to
assist claimants to navigate the claims process.”130
These
representatives are usually not lawyers “but they may be far more
attuned to the procedural esoterica of the VA claims system than
most lawyers.”131 The court noted that “the appellant was represented,
quite actively, by such an accredited representative.”132
In Maggitt v. West,133 the Federal Circuit considered whether the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims erred in holding that it lacked
the authority to hear the claimant’s constitutional and Administrative
Procedure Act challenges because he had not presented those issues
earlier in the claims process.134 Those arguments were similar to the
arguments made in Ledford, i.e., that the agency did not follow APA
notice and comment procedures with respect to two regulations that
were repealed, and that the Regional Office’s failure to cite
applicable case law violated his due process rights because it was
inconsistent with a VA statute.135
The court stated that “to the extent the Veterans Court decision in
this case implies that the exhaustion doctrine is jurisdictional in
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Akles v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 118, 121 (1991)).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 174-75.
130. Id. at 175.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 202 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
134. See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377 (turning to the question of exhaustion of
remedies and noting that the “Veterans Court” held that it lacked the authority to
hear the claimant’s APA challenge because he had not presented it earlier).
135. Compare id. at 1373, with Ledford, 136 F.3d at 778.
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nature, it is incorrect.”136 The court also indicated that a decision on
the exhaustion issue should be “case-specific in balancing the
competing interests of the veteran and the government.”137
The court reasoned, relying on McCarthy v. Madigan,138 that when
Congress has not clearly mandated the exhaustion of particular
administrative remedies, the exhaustion doctrine is not jurisdictional,
but is a matter for the exercise of “sound judicial discretion.”139 “The
exercise of that discretion, requires fashioning of exhaustion
principles in a manner consistent with congressional intent and any
applicable statutory scheme.”140 The Federal Circuit further noted
that the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is
uniquely positioned to balance and decide the considerations
regarding exhaustion in a particular case, and that, over time, it
will develop a body of law in its unique setting that will permit
comparable certainty in outcome that has occurred in other fields
of law . . . this case presents the opportunity for the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims to articulate the grounds upon which
141
the exhaustion doctrine should, or should not, be invoked.

The Federal Circuit’s opinion in Maggitt appears inconsistent with
its Ledford opinion in several areas. First, the two opinions are
inconsistent as to the issue of whether the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies applies to veterans benefits cases. The court
in Ledford said that the claimant was required to exhaust.142 In
Maggitt, where the claimant made arguments for the first time on
appeal that were similar to the ones made in Ledford,143 the court
noted that “it is open to question whether application of an
exhaustion requirement is consistent with the statutory purposes
underlying the veterans benefits laws . . . .”144
Second, there are inconsistencies in the case law authority cited,
even though the arguments raised for the first time on appeal were
similar. In Ledford, the court primarily relied on Aircraft & Diesel Corp.
v. Hirsh,145 a 1947 Supreme Court case.146 In Maggitt, the court
136. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377.
137. Id. at 1378.
138. 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
139. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377 (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144).
140. Id. (quoting McCarthy, 503 U.S. at 144).
141. Id. at 1378.
142. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 780-82 (concluding that there is no legal basis for
suspending application of the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies in veterans
benefits cases).
143. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
144. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377.
145. 331 U.S. 752 (1947).
146. See Ledford, 136 F.3d at 780-81 (relying on Aircraft & Diesel to find that a lack
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primarily relied on McCarthy v. Madigan,147 a 1992 Supreme Court
case.148 This is not an instance of a Supreme Court opinion being
issued after the Federal Circuit’s first opinion, thus, changing the way
the court viewed the issue; every Supreme Court case that the Maggitt
opinion cited in 2000 had been decided at least five years prior to the
Ledford opinion in 1998.149
Furthermore, neither case cited Darby v. Cisneros,150 a 1993 Supreme
Court case that did much to change the law of exhaustion under the
APA.151 Professor Davis characterized Darby as holding that “a
petitioner for review of an otherwise final agency action is not
required to exhaust an available remedy that consists of a
‘reconsideration’ or ‘an appeal to superior agency authority’ unless it
is explicitly required by statute or rule.”152 Some federal appellate
courts have stated the holding similarly.153 Because the administrative
appeals process in veterans benefits cases is required by statute,154 the
Darby holding appears at first glance to be inapplicable to veterans
benefits cases. Some courts, however, read the holding of Darby more
broadly.155 Both the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
of agency power to provide a remedy does not eliminate the exhaustion
requirement).
147. 503 U.S. 140 (1992).
148. See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377 (citing McCarthy for the proposition that when
Congress has not specifically required exhaustion, the doctrine is left for judicial
discretion).
149. See id. at 1378 (citing Reiter v. Cooper, 502 U.S. 258, 261 (1993); McCarthy v.
Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992); Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982);
McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185
(1969)).
150. 509 U.S. 137 (1993).
151. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX . L. REV.
113, 152 (1998) (discussing “Darby v. Cisneros and the Death of Exhaustion Doctrine
in APA Cases”); Bernard Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative Law: 1987-1996, 32
TULSA L.J. 493, 560 (1997) (referring to the “Darby gutting” of the exhaustion
requirement).
152. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE (2000 Supp.), supra note 5, § 15.3, at 472.
153. See DSE, Inc. v. United States, 169 F.3d 21, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (citing Darby
and noting that, under the APA, “a party can seek judicial review from a final agency
action without pursuing an intra-agency appeal unless required to do so by statute or
by regulation”); Acura of Bellevue v. Reich, 90 F.3d 1403, 1408 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“Darby held that a person aggrieved by an agency decision is not required to exhaust
nonmandatory administrative remedies, such as filing an optional appeal to a
superior agency authority, before seeking judicial review.”).
154. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105, 7106 (1994) (outlining the process for filing and
reviewing appeals from Regional Office decisions).
155. See Trafalgar Capital Assocs., Inc. v. Cuomo, 159 F.3d 21, 36 n.15 (1st Cir.
1998) (“[I]f a claim arises under the APA, courts may not exercise their judicial
discretion to require exhaustion of administrative remedies if the statute and agency
rules do not otherwise require exhaustion.”); Bastek v. Federal. Crop Ins. Corp., 145
F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he Supreme Court has instructed that if Congress has
not enacted an explicit exhaustion requirement, courts may not exercise their
judicial discretion to impose one.”); Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. EPA, 46 F.3d 1208, 1210 n.2
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Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims have cited Darby several times,
but neither court has cited it in discussing an exhaustion issue in a
veterans benefits case.156
Third, the two decisions are inconsistent in their reading of the
legislative intent and purpose underlying the Veterans’ Judicial
Review Act.157 In Ledford, the court stated that “[t]he legislative
history provides no basis for us to conclude that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply here.”158 In
Maggitt, the court questioned whether “an exhaustion requirement is
consistent with the statutory purposes underlying the veterans
benefits laws . . . .”159
Fourth, the decisions are inconsistent in their statement of the
exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. In Ledford, the court rejected
the claimant’s argument that exhaustion was not required because
the Board did not have the power to invalidate the circular he
challenged, noting that a lack of agency power to provide a remedy
concerning issues beyond its charter “does not necessarily relieve a
claimant from presenting those issues as part of a challenge to an
agency decision.”160 In Maggitt, however, the court indicated that if
there is “some doubt as to whether the agency was empowered to
grant effective relief,”161 the doctrine “should not be invoked.”162
Furthermore, in Maggitt, the Federal Circuit did not mention its
Carbino decision,163 decided after Ledford. In Carbino, the Federal
Circuit cited the adversarial process as a reason for the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims not to reach an issue that was not timely
presented.164 In Maggitt, the court cited the “nonadversarial, ex parte
(D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Darby for the proposition that “courts cannot require
exhaustion of administrative remedies where, as here, it is not expressly required by
statute or agency rule”).
156. See, e.g., Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1524 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (citing Darby for
the proposition that “extrinsic evidence of intent (i.e. legislative history materials) is
properly considered only if the intrinsic evidence yields no clear answer”); Brooks v.
Brown, 5 Vet. App. 484, 486 (1993) (quoting Darby as stating that “[r]ecourse to the
legislative history . . . is unnecessary in light of the plain meaning of the statutory
text”).
157. Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105
(1988) (codified as amended throughout scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.).
158. Ledford, 136 F.3d at 778.
159. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378.
160. Ledford, 136 F.3d at 780.
161. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377 (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 508 U.S. 137, 147
(1992), which quotes Gibson v. Berryhill, 419 U.S. 564, 575 n.14 (1973)).
162. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377.
163. See supra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (discussing the analysis of the
Federal Circuit in Maggitt).
164. See Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 34 (Fed. Cir. 1999); cf. 2 DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 5, § 15.1, at 305 (describing exhaustion of administrative remedies as an
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system that supplies veterans benefits” as a basis for its decision.165
Additionally, in Carbino, the court relied on cases from other federal
appellate courts as a basis for deciding the issue in a veterans benefits
case, implying that the veterans benefits appeals process is similar to
other federal appeals.166 In Maggitt, however, the court urged the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims to “develop a body of law in its
unique setting.”167
The Supreme Court recently held that social security benefits
claimants who had otherwise exhausted their administrative remedies
did not have to exhaust issues in a “request for review” in order to
preserve judicial review of those issues.168 In social security benefits
cases, a “request for review” enables a claimant to obtain judicial
review.169 The author of the Columbia Law Review article on issue
exhaustion in social security cases discussed later in this Article170 was
on the briefs for the claimant,171 and the Court cited the article in its
opinion.172
It is unclear how, or even if, Sims applies to veterans benefits
appeals. Much of the Court’s reasoning was specific to the social
security benefits appeals system,173 but there was some language that
was broader. Veterans benefits appeals were mentioned at oral
argument,174 but not in the opinion. Because of the differences
between the social security benefits appeals process and the veterans
benefits appeals process, that holding may not be applicable to
veterans benefits appeals.
issue of timing).
165. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377.
166. See Carbino, 168 F.3d at 34 (noting that other courts have established that
issues initially raised in a reply briefs should not be considered) (citing Headrick v.
Rockwell Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1227-78 (10th Cir. 1994), Frazier v. Bailey, 957
F.2d 920, 932 (1st Cir. 1992) and Reynolds v. Eastdyer Dev. Co., 882 F.2d 1249, 1253
(7th Cir. 1989)).
167. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1378.
168. Sims v. Apfel, 120 S. Ct. 2080 (2000).
169. See id. at 2082 (“Petitioner then requested that the Social Security Appeals
Council review her claims. A claimant may request such review by completing a onepage form provided by the Social Security Administration (SSA)—Form HA 520—or
‘by any other writing specifically requesting review.’ 20 C.F.R. § 422.205(a)
(1999).”).
170. See infra notes 195-99.
171. See 2000 WL 115893 (Brief for Petitioner), 2000 WL 297722 (Reply Brief for
Petitioner).
174. See Sims, 120 S. Ct. at 2085, 2086.
173. See William Funk, Supreme Court News: Issue Exhaustion Splits Court, 26 ADMIN. &
REG . L. NEWS 7 (Fall 2000) (noting that “Outside the Social Security context it is
unlikely that Apfel has any force. Not only do the four dissenters indicate the view
that issue exhaustion is the general rule, subject to only the rarest of exceptions, but
Justice O’Connor clearly viewed the situation in Apfel unique”).
174. The author attended the argument.
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First, the Court conceded that an agency may promulgate
regulations in order to require issue exhaustion, but the Social
Security Administration had not done so.175 VA statutes and
regulations, however, indicate that in a Substantive Appeal, the
claimants “should set out specific allegations of error of fact or law,
such allegations related to specific items in the statement of the
case.”176
Second, the Court emphasized how short the social security appeal
form was—it provided only three lines for the request for review and
the notice accompanying the form indicated that it would take only
ten minutes to complete the form.177 The Court noted that the form
“strongly suggests that the Council does not depend much, if at all,
on claimants to identify issues for review.”178 The VA appeal form, VA
Form 9, the “Appeal to the Board of Veterans’ Appeals” is not as
limited as the social security appeal form. The Form 9 provides about
a third of a page for the box marked “I HEREBY PETITION THE
BOARD OF VETERANS’ APPEALS FOR RELIEF AS SET FORTH
BELOW. (State in specific detail the benefits sought on appeal and
your reasons for believing that the action appealed is erroneous.
Read carefully paragraphs 1 through 5 of the ‘Instructions’.)”179 It
also indicates “Continue on the back, or attach sheets of paper, if you
need more space.”180 The instructions indicate that
The benefit sought on appeal must be clearly identified. In
preparing your appellate argument in the space provided . . . care
should be taken to set out errors of fact or law believed to have
been made in the determination—that is, the reasons for
disagreeing with the determination being appealed. Appeals which
fail to allege specific error of fact or law in the determination may
181
be dismissed by the [Board].

Further, the form indicates that it would take one hour to fill it out.182
Third, the Court noted that a large portion of social security
claimants “either have no representation at all or are represented by
non-attorneys . . .”183 Before the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, however,
175. See Sims, 120 S. Ct. at 2084.
176. 38 U.S.C. § 7105(d)(3) (1994); see Stuckey, 13 Vet. App. at 174 (citing section
7105(d)(3) in support of requiring issue exhaustion); see also 38 C.F.R. § 20.202
(1999) (implementing regulation).
177. Sims, 120 S. Ct. at 2086.
178. Id.
179. VA Form 9, OMB No. 2900-0085; see http://www.va.gov/forms/data/9.pdf.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Sims, 120 S. Ct. at 2086.
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most claimants are represented by attorneys or representatives from
veterans service organizations.184 The Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims has noted that these representatives “are not generally lawyers
but they may be far more attuned to the procedural esoterica of the
VA claims system than most lawyers.”185
Fourth, the issue that the Supreme Court considered in Sims was
narrow—whether a claimant was required to exhaust an issue “by
presenting it to the Appeals Council in his request for review.”186 The
Court explicitly stated that “whether a claimant must exhaust issues
before the ALJ is not before us.”187 In other words, the question
before the Court was whether the claimant was required to address a
particular issue explicitly in the agency’s official appeal form in order
to preserve judicial review of the issue. An affirmative answer would
give a claimant a narrowly limited opportunity to raise an issue
(which was further limited by the short form provided for an appeal).
In veterans benefits cases, imposing an issue exhaustion
requirement would not require that a claimant raise the issue in the
agency’s official appeal form, the VA Form 9. Rather, the question
would be whether the claimant raised the issue in any manner prior
to the Board’s decision.188 A claimant could raise the issue in the
Notice of Disagreement, Substantive Appeal, in a letter to the Board
or Regional Office, or in a hearing before the Board or the Regional
Office. Thus, a VA claimant’s opportunity to raise an issue would not
be as narrowly limited—either in terms of the time for raising the
issue or the space provided on the official appeal form.
The Federal Circuit has addressed whether the Sims holding
applies to issues raised for the first time in an appeal from a decision
of the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, reaching conflicting
conclusions.189 As of February 2001, the Court of Appeals for
184. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
185. Stuckey, 13 Vet. App. at 175.
186. Sims, 120 S. Ct. at 2083.
187. Id. at 2083-84.
188. See Douglas v. Derwinski, 2 Vet. App. 435, 439 (1992) (“Nowhere does the
regulation [38 C.F.R. § 20.202] state that only the issues raised in the Form 1-9
appeal must be considered . . .”).
189. Compare Forshey v. West, 226 F.3d 1299, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Sims,
and reaching issue not raised before CAVC), with Belcher v. West, 214 F.3d 1335,
1337 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (distinguishing Sims on the ground that a statute required
issue exhaustion, and Sims involved review of an agency decision by a court rather
than review of another court’s judgment, and holding that it would not consider an
issue on appeal unless the CAVC addressed it or the issue was raised by a party before
the CAVC), and Forshey, 226 F.3d at 1306 (Schall, J., dissenting) (“Belcher determined
that these conditions [for raising an issue in a Federal Circuit appeal] were not in
consistent with Sims v. Apfel . . . because that decision addressed a situation where
there was no statute or regulation on point, whereas our jurisdiction over appeals

OCONNORJCI.DOC

2000]

6/19/2001 10:50 AM

VETERANS BENEFITS APPEALS PROCESS

1305

Veterans Claims had not addressed whether the Sims holding applies
to issues raised for the first time in an appeal from a decision of the
Board.
There appears to be a conflict in the Federal Circuit’s case law
between treating veterans benefits cases like other federal appellate
cases (Ledford and Carbino) and treating them as a unique area of law
(Maggitt). Given the conflicting goals of the veterans benefits appeals
process, it is not surprising to see the conflict reflected in case law.
The question is whether there is an approach that can better
accommodate and reconcile these competing and sometimes
conflicting goals—an approach that can bring concordance to these
discordant cases.
The approach advocated in this Article, that the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims should consider only those issues that the Board
did decide or should have decided, is consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s holding that it would only consider issues that the CAVC did
decide or that the parties raised.190
V. OPTIONS FOR RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
There are three basic ways to resolve this conflict: requiring issue
exhaustion for all issues; not requiring issue exhaustion for any issue;
and requiring issue exhaustion for some issues, but not others.
A. Requiring Issue Exhaustion for All Issues
A court could require that a claimant exhaust with respect to all
issues. In the context of veterans benefits appeals, this approach
seems overly demanding. In fact, the Federal Circuit rejected this
approach in Maggitt, noting that,
[n]othing in the statutory scheme providing benefits for
veterans mandates a jurisdictional requirement of exhaustion
of remedies which would require the Veterans Court to
disregard every legal argument not previously made before
the Board of Veterans’ Appeals. In fact, such an absolute
from the CAVC is governed by 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a).”). See generally Howard v. Gober,
220 F.3d 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (relying on Belcher in declining to address an
issue where the claimant “did not raise that interpretation to the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims, and that court did not otherwise raise it sua sponte in its
decision”); Nolen v. Gober, 222 F.3d 1356, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (distinguishing
Belcher on the ground that the CAVC raised the issue sua sponte).
190. See Belcher, 214 F.3d at 1337 (court would not consider a legal issue or
argument on appeal “absent at least one of two conditions: (1) the Court of Appeals
for Veterans Claims addressed the issue or argument, or (2) the issue or argument
was raised by a party to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims”).
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rule would be inconsistent with the nonadversarial ex parte
system that supplies veterans benefits.191
B. Not Requiring Issue Exhaustion for Any Issue
A court could also agree to hear any argument that was not raised
below. This approach would have definite advantages for claimants.
They would not be penalized for not having legal counsel before the
Board of Veterans’ Appeals.192
However, this approach does not take seriously the fact that the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims is an appellate court. As an
appellate court, its primary function is to correct the errors of the
lower tribunal, i.e., the Board.193 An approach which would allow
claimants to raise any issue for the first time on appeal would make
the “of Appeals” part of the court’s name almost meaningless.194
This is the approach advocated by the leading article that addresses
the issue in the context of Social Security Administration benefits
appeals.195 The author argues for “a blanket exemption from issue
exhaustion” in all social security benefits cases.196 When applied to
191. Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1377.
192. See CHAIRMAN’ S REPORT, supra note 25, at 32 (appoximately five percent of
claimants before the Board were represented by attorneys).
193. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (noting that correction of error
is the primary function of an appellate court and that “error” must be understood in
light of what the appellate court may legitimately expect from the lower tribunal).
194. In Maggitt, the Federal Circuit referred to the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims as the “Veterans Court.” See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1372 (“Adway Maggitt, Jr.,
appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(Veterans Court) . . . .”). Referring to that court as the “Veterans Court” seems
curious for a couple of reasons. First, it reverses the order of the words that appear
in the court’s official title-—placing the word “Court” after “Veterans” instead of
before. Second, it omits any reference to the fact that that court is an appellate
court.
The Maggitt opinion marked the second time in several years that the Federal
Circuit used the term “Veterans Court” in a published opinion. In the six years prior
to the Maggitt decision, the Federal Circuit had used the term “Veterans Court” only
once in a published opinion, and that was quoting the case that had last used the
term (three years earlier). See Degmetich v. Brown, 104 F.3d 1328, 1331 (Fed. Cir.
1997) (“[O]ur review of Veterans’ Court judgments entails the review of underlying
agency action.”) (quoting Smith v. Brown, 35 F.3d 1516, 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
During those six years, the Federal Circuit used “Court of Veterans Appeals” or
“Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims” or the acronym CAVC much more
frequently—terms that did not omit a reference to it being an appellate court.
It is interesting to note that in the two cases in which the Federal Circuit treated
that court as an appellate court, Ledford and Carbino, the Federal Circuit referred to it
as the “Court of Veterans Appeals.” See Carbino, 168 F.3d at 33; Ledford, 136 F.3d at
778. But in Maggitt, which seems to imply that the usual rules governing appellate
courts do not apply to that court, the Federal Circuit merely referred to it as the
“Veterans Court.” See Maggitt, 202 F.3d at 1372.
195. See Dubin, supra note 6, at 1296 (exploring the creation of a “issue
exhaustion” rule in agencies, like the VA, that provide benefits).
196. See id. at 1340 (arguing that within the context of the Social Security
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veterans benefits appeals, this approach and the supporting
arguments are problematic for a number of reasons.
The article offers two main arguments supporting its claim that
issue exhaustion is not appropriate for social security cases. First, the
article argues that the purposes of the doctrine of exhaustion are not
served by applying it to social security cases.197 In the context of
veterans benefits appeals, however, this argument does not take into
account the error-correcting function of an appellate court,198 and
does not treat the reviewing court like a court “of appeals.”
Second, the article argues that applying issue exhaustion violates
procedural due process and discusses the Supreme Court’s Mathews v.
Eldridge199 opinion. In Eldridge, the Court considered whether the Due
Process Clause required that, prior to the termination of social
security disability benefit payments, the recipient should be afforded
an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.200 The Court reasoned
that “resolution of the issue whether the administrative procedures
provided here are constitutionally sufficient require[d] analysis of the
governmental and private interests that [were] affected.”201
The Court held that a procedural due process analysis required
consideration of three factors: the private interest affected by the
official action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest
through the procedures used, as well as the probable value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government’s
interest, including the fiscal or administrative burdens that additional
procedural requirements would impose.202
Applying the Eldridge analysis to veterans benefits appeals, however,
is problematic for a number of reasons. In order for a due process
analysis to apply, there would have to be a property interest.203 The
Supreme Court has held that a person receiving federal disability
Administration proceedings, the administration’s deceptive conduct and absence of
justification supporting issue exhaustion support a “blanket exemption from issue
exhaustion”).
197. See id. at 1323-31 (arguing that the purposes underlying regulatory agency
issue exhaustion are not served and in some cases are substantially undermined in an
inquisitional benefactory agency setting).
198. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (noting that correction of error
is the primary function of an appellate court and that “error” must be understood in
light of what the appellate court may legitimately expect from the lower tribunal).
199. 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (determining that an evidentiary hearing is not
required by due process prior to termination of disability benefits).
200. Id. at 323.
201. Id. at 334.
202. Id. at 335.
203. See id. at 332 (“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”).
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benefits has a property interest in continuing to receive the
benefits.204 It is unclear, however, whether applicants for veterans
benefits have a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Supreme Court has stated that “[w]e have never held that
applicants for benefits, as distinct from those already receiving them,
have a legitimate claim of entitlement protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment.”205 Further, the Court
recently held that applicants for disability benefits who did not meet
the criteria for those benefits did not have a “property interest” for
Due Process Clause purposes.206 The Court, however, did not address
the issue of whether there was a property interest in the claims for
payment.207 Even if there is a property interest for veterans benefits
applicants, applying the Mathews analysis in this context is
problematic.
There is also the issue of the timing of a due process challenge. A
claimant may not generally bring a constitutional challenge until
after there has been a constitutional violation.208 The alleged
constitutional violation—application of the issue exhaustion
doctrine—would occur, at the earliest, when the Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims made its decision.209 Thus, the earliest a claimant
could bring such a challenge would be after the court made its
decision—by moving for reconsideration of the decision, for a panel
decision, for full court review, or by appealing to the Federal Circuit.
If the claimant appealed to the Federal Circuit, then the Federal
Circuit would have no decision from the Court of Appeals for

204. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that an individual
receiving federal welfare assistance has a statutorily-created property interest in the
continued receipt of those benefits that affords him a right to an evidentiary hearing
before those property rights are terminated).
205. Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 942 (1986) (citing Walters v. National Ass’n of
Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 n.8 (1985)), quoted in Richard v. West, 161 F.3d
719, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see Owings v. Brown, 8 Vet. App. 17, 23 (1995) (noting that
the Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the extent to which applicants for, rather
than recipients of, government benefits have property rights in their expectations
and observing that the lower federal courts are split).
206. See American Mfgrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 60 (1999) (holding
that under Pennsylvania law an employee is not entitled to payment of medical
benefits that are not “reasonable and necessary” under an employer’s health care
plan).
207. See id. at 61 n.13 (noting that the Court did not address the issue of whether
there is a property interest in claims for payment).
208. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 15.12 (indicating that the “case or
controversy” limitation on federal jurisdiction in Article III of the Constitution
requires that an issue be ripe for consideration).
209. It would not be until the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims issued a
decision that a claimant would know that the court required exhaustion in that
particular case. See 38 U.S.C. ' 7267 (1994).
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Veterans Claims on the issue of whether the application of the issue
exhaustion doctrine violated the Due Process Clause.
C. Requiring Issue Exhaustion for Some Issues, But Not Others
Finally, a court could choose to hear some arguments that were not
raised below, but not others. There are several methods to
determine which arguments a court should hear.
1.

Case-by-case balancing versus a general rule
In choosing to consider some arguments, but not others, there are
two basic approaches a court could take: case-by-case balancing and
adopting a general rule. This choice is not new, or unique to this
area of the law. Twenty-four centuries ago, Aristotle recognized the
choice between equity, that is, “special enactments for particular
cases,” and law, which is a “universal or general statement.”210
A case-by-case “balancing” test approach has the advantage of being
able to take into account the facts of the individual case. After all, “a
general statement cannot apply rightly to all cases.”211 In such cases,
“[w]hen the law has spoken in general terms, and there arises a case
of exception to the general rule,” which the general law omitted, a
court may wish “to set right the omission by ruling it as the lawgiver
himself would rule were he there present, and would have provided
by law had he foreseen the case would arise.”212
This approach, however, has significant disadvantages. The
balancing approach has the disadvantage of producing inconsistent
results.213 This inconsistency results in case law that leads even the
most knowledgeable commentators to make such unhelpful
generalizations as “[e]xhaustion of administrative remedies is
sometimes required and sometimes not.”214 Because the case law is
inconsistent, it is also unpredictable, providing little guidance to the
210. ARISTOTLE, N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS 95 (William Kaufman ed. & D.P. Chase
trans., Dover Publ'ns 1998); see Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1685 (1976) (arguing that there are “two
opposed modes” for dealing with substantive legal problems, the first favors the use
of “clearly defined, highly administrable, general rules” and the second “supports the
use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with relatively little
precedential value”).
211. ARISTOTLE, supra note 210, at 95.
212. Id.
213. See Marcia R. Gelpe, Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons From
Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. W ASH. L. REV. 1, 26 (1984/1985) (arguing that the
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are vague and that the trend to balance
various considerations leads to inconsistency among the holdings and treatment of
issues in similar cases).
214. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EIGHTIES § 26:1, at 434 (1989).
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agency, claimants, or counsel as to which arguments will be
considered for the first time on appeal and which will not.215 Further,
the inconsistent case law makes it more difficult for courts to decide
those cases.216 Finally, this inconsistency results in more litigation
over whether exhaustion is required, wasting the agency’s,217
claimants’, and the courts’ resources in the process.218
This inconsistency and unpredictability is due to the fact that a
balancing approach provides no principled basis for distinguishing
arguments that a court will hear from ones that it will not. Professor
Davis has suggested that perhaps all judicial generalization about
exhaustion should be qualified by words such as “except when the
reviewing court in its discretion otherwise decides.”219 Because courts
“exercise discretion in many cases, the courts have not developed a
useful overall principle.”220 Professor Davis has also noted that the
doctrine of exhaustion was “about as unprincipled as any subject on
which judicial opinions are written can be.”221
A second option is for a court to adopt a general rule regarding
issue exhaustion. That is, it could consider certain types of
arguments, even if raised for the first time on appeal, but not other
types of arguments. This would have the advantages of predictability
and providing a principled basis for distinguishing cases.
This approach would be an attempt for a court to do what
Professor Davis suggested in an earlier version of his treatise—that is,
“construct a rational body of precedents which could be logically
applied to any problem not yet decided.”222
Professor Davis
recognized that:

215. See Gelpe, supra note 213, at 27 (arguing that because the exhaustion theory
is so vague, parties cannot predict with any accuracy whether or not a court will
require exhaustion before going to court); Richard Orman, Comment, Rafeedie v.
INS: Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and the Exclusion of Permanent Resident Aliens,
4 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 301, 302 (1990) (noting that the law of exhaustion is neither a
reliable nor predictable indicator for attorneys because of its inconsistent application
by judges).
216. See Gelpe, supra note 213, at 27 (noting that a court’s decision-making
process is hampered by the exhaustion exceptions that are “difficult to apply, or that
must be weighed and balanced”).
217. See id. at 28 (noting that a bright line rule on exhaustion would obviate the
need for costly litigation).
218. See id. at 27 (noting that the uncertainty about the laws of exhaustion that
pervades the judicial system increases litigation).
219. See DAVIS, supra note 214, § 26:1, at 434.
220. Id.
221. KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 20:07, at 466
(1976).
222. 4 Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 26:1, at 415 (2d ed. 1983).
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[t]he overwhelming fact about the law of exhaustion is that it is not
of that character; instead, it is generally near the opposite end of
the scale . . . . Each decision tends to be ad hoc . . . . No judge at
any level has undertaken to work out a rational overall system. No
judicial opinion has attempted a comprehensive treatment of the
223
exhaustion problem.

2.

Types of arguments on appeal: suggestions for a taxonomy
If a court is to adopt an issue exhaustion rule based on types of
arguments, what types of arguments should be included and what
types should be excluded from the issue exhaustion requirement?
The number of specific legal arguments that may be made on appeal
is probably infinite.224 Montaigne wrote over four centuries ago that
law is “the mother of altercation and division.”225 Legislators may pass
many laws but “[w]hat have our legislators gained by culling out a
hundred thousand particular cases, and applying to these a hundred
thousand laws? This number holds no manner of proportion with
the infinite diversity of human actions.”226 The number of laws do not
curb the authority of judges, because “there is as much liberty and
latitude in the interpretation of law[s], as in their form.”227 Lawyers
do not simplify matters, but instead “they put us into a way of
extending and diversifying difficulties, and lengthen and disperse
them. In sowing and retailing questions, they make the world fructify
and increase in uncertainties and disputes . . . .”228 In addition, legal
commentators, instead of bringing clarity to a subject, “open the
matter, and spill it in pouring out: of one subject [they] make a
thousand, and in multiplying and subdividing them, fall again into
the infinity of atoms of Epicurus.”229
The universe of possible appellate arguments, however, may be
broken down into manageable categories.230 Arguments on appeal
can be distinguished based on the form or structure of the argument,
the legal authority relied on, the substance of the rule (what does it
require whom to do?), and whether the argument relies on the
223. Id.
224. See Hillery v. Rushen, 720 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1983).
225. M ICHEL EYQUEM DE M ONTAIGNE, Of Experience, in T HE ESSAYS (1580), reprinted
in 25 GREAT B OOKS OF THE WESTERN W ORLD 517 (W. Carew Hazlitt ed. & Charles
Cotton trans., 1952).
226. Id. at 516.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 517.
229. Id.
230. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 210, at 1713 (asserting that “the arguments lawyers
use are relatively few in number and highly stereotyped, although they are applied in
an infinite diversity of factual situations”).
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settled “rules of the game” or seeks to change those rules.
a. The form or structure of the argument on appeal
Legal rules, whether contained in a constitution, statute, or
regulation, generally take one of three forms or structures. First,
legal rules define terms.231 These rules take the form of a tautology or
a definition. Second, legal rules create conditional statements. In
other words, such rules take the form of “If X, then Y.” That is, if
certain criteria are met, or if a certain action is taken, then there are
certain consequences.232 Third, legal rules create a relationship
between a certain actor (or actors) and a certain action (or actions).
In other words, such rules take the form of “A (an actor) may or may
not/shall or shall not do X (an action).”233
A particular statute or regulation may involve a combination of two
or more of these forms. But almost all statutes or regulations, to the
extent that they constitute rules, can be reduced to these three
constituent parts.
Arguments about legal rules, especially in an appeal, are a bit more
complex, but not much more so (at least in form). Arguments raised
on appeal will involve reliance (express or implied) on some sort of
legal authority. In other words, arguments on appeal (other than
purely factual issues or appellate-court-specific ones such as appellate
jurisdiction and scope and standard of review) will take either the
form of “The lower tribunal failed to apply X” or “The lower tribunal
erred in applying X” where “X” is some sort of legal authority—a
constitutional provision, a statute, a regulation, or case law. That is,
the argument about the legal rule will take the form of either an
error of omission or error of commission by the lower tribunal, and
the legal rule or rules contained in the legal authority that the
appellate argument relies on will take one of the three forms
described above.
231. Cf. 1 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54 (noting that “every law may be
said to consist of several parts” and that one of those parts is “declaratory; whereby
the rights to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and
laid down”).
232. Cf. id. (stating that one of the parts of every law is “usually termed sanction, or
vindicatory branch of the law; whereby it is signified what evil or penalty shall be
incurred by such as commit any public wrongs, and transgress or neglect their
duty.”).
233. Cf. id. at *53 (defining “law” as a rule of civil conduct prescribed by the state,
“commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong.”), id. at *54 (noting that
one of the parts of every law is “directory: whereby the subject is instructed and
enjoined to observe those rights, and to abstain from the commission of those
wrongs”), id. at *55 (stating that “the very essence of right and wrong depends on the
direction of the laws to do or to omit them”).
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These distinctions may be useful in describing appellate
arguments, but they do not provide a good basis for distinguishing
arguments for issue exhaustion purposes. An appellate court should
expect the lower tribunal to apply all three forms. As noted below,
when stated in a more specific way, they may provide a useful basis for
distinguishing types of arguments.
b. The legal authority relied on
These distinctions are more clear cut. As noted above, arguments
on appeal will be based on some appeal to legal authority, whether
express or implied. In the veterans benefits appeals area, that legal
authority will generally consist of one or more of the following: the
United States Constitution; federal statutes and regulations that the
agency is charged with administering;234 other federal statutes and
regulations that the agency is not charged with administering; and
case law interpreting the Constitution, statutes, and regulations.
To the extent that a claimant relies on some unpublished rule,
such as an agency manual or circular, the real authority for the
argument will be the Administrative Procedure Act235—i.e., an
argument that the unpublished rule constitutes a binding
“substantive rule” and thus should have the “force and effect of law”
even though it is neither a statute nor a regulation.236
Because the agency is charged with administering its agencyspecific statutes,237 it should have expertise in that area. Thus,
allowing arguments that rely on agency-specific statutes or regulations
to be raised for the first time on appeal seems reasonable because an
234. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-8528 (1994) (providing laws related to veterans’
benefits); see also 38 C.F.R. §§ 0.735-47.2 (1999).
235. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (1994) (outlining administrative practice and
procedure for federal agencies).
236. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301 (1979) (citing the
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b),(d) (1994) and stating that “[t]he
central distinction among agency regulations found in the APA is that between
‘substantive rules’ on the one hand and ‘interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice’ on the other.”); see
also Buzinski v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 360, 369 (1994) (“[I]n order for VA handbooks,
circulars, and manuals to have the ‘force and effect of law’ they must ‘prescribe
substantive rules—not interpretive rules.’”) (quoting Rank v. Nimmo, 677 F.2d 692,
698 (9th Cir. 1982)).
237. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 15.8, at 341 (describing how courts are
hesitant to reverse the determinations of agencies due to the agencies’ expertise
regarding agency-specific statutes); cf. Federal Election Comm’n v. Democratic
Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981) (holding that an
interpretation of a statute by the administrative agency charged with administering it
is entitled to deference to the extent that the administrative construction, whether
reached by adjudication or by rulemaking, is not inconsistent with the statutory
mandate and does not frustrate the policy that Congress sought to implement).

OCONNORJCI.DOC

1314

6/19/2001 10:50 AM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1279

appellate court should be able to expect that the agency would be
familiar with the statutes and regulations it is charged with
administering. That is, a thorough knowledge of veterans benefits
law is the sort of “skillfulness” that “those who adjudicate” veterans
benefits claims should be expected to have.238
The agency, however, is not charged with administering the
Constitution or other federal statutes and regulations.239 A thorough
knowledge of such provisions would not necessarily be within the
agency decisionmaker’s area of expertise or “skillfulness.” Further,
the agency decisionmaker should not be expected to anticipate all
possible arguments, based on authority other than veterans benefits
statutes and regulations, that counsel may make at some later time.
The appellate court should expect the agency adjudicator to have
skill in adjudication, not prognostication. Thus, allowing a claimant
to raise arguments based on authority other than the record and
veterans benefits statutes and regulations for the first time on appeal
would not be appropriate because those arguments would not involve
an agency’s area of expertise or a statute or regulation it is charged
with administering.
c. The function or substance of the rule
If the agency is to be expected to apply agency-specific statutes and
regulations, should that apply to all agency-specific statutes and
regulations? Statutes and regulations may be distinguished according
to their function. In other words, there are several answers to the
question “What does this rule do?” Legal rules applicable to
administrative agencies generally perform five functions. These
functions are related to the legal-rule distinctions based on form or
structure, but are more specific in identifying actors.240
First, rules require a claimant to take certain kinds of actions or
proscribe certain actions by a claimant.241 Because the Secretary may
238. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (noting that appeals are needed to
correct “the unfairness or unskillfulness of those who adjudicate”).
239. See 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 5, § 15.8, at 341-43 (outlining agencies’
expertise in administration of agency-specific statutes).
240. That is, the first, fourth, and fifth types of rules take the third form/structure,
i.e., legal rules that create a relationship between a certain actor and a certain action.
See supra note 233 and accompanying text. The second type takes the first form, i.e.,
definitions and criteria. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. The third type
can be viewed as either criteria or as a conditional statement. See supra note 232 and
accompanying text.
241. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 231, at *53 (defining “law” as a rule of civil
conduct, “commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong”), id. at *123
(noting that the first of the two types of “rights of persons” consists of “such as are
due from every citizen, which are usually called civil duties”). See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. §
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not appeal from an agency decision,242 and a claimant is unlikely to
argue that he or she failed to take certain required actions, it is
unlikely that the claimant’s failure to take a certain action would be a
basis for an argument made by the claimant for the first time on
appeal in a veterans benefits case. Second, rules set forth definitions
or criteria.243 Examples include regulations defining who is a
veteran,244 and criteria for disability ratings, which range from 10% to
100%.245 Third, and closely related to the second, rules establish
entitlement to a certain kind of benefit. These include statutes and
regulations establishing entitlement to compensation for serviceconnected disabilities,246 compensation for the surviving spouse and
children of a veteran who dies from a service-connected disability,247
and entitlement to a pension for a veteran who is permanently and
totally disabled from a disability that is not service-connected.248
Fourth, rules require an agency to make certain decisions249 or to
make certain presumptions in making decisions.250 Fifth, rules
require an agency to take certain kinds of actions251 or proscribe
certain actions by the agency.252
7105(b)(1) (1994) (explaining that claimant must file Notice of Disagreement within
one year of mailing of notice of decision in order to appeal); 38 C.F.R. § 20.302(a)
(1999) (same).
242. See 38 U.S.C. § 7252(a) (1994).
243. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 231, at *54 (noting that “every law may be said to
consist of several parts” and that one of those parts is “declaratory; whereby the rights
to be observed, and the wrongs to be eschewed, are clearly defined and laid down”).
244. See 38 C.F.R. § 3.1(d) (1999) (“Veteran” means “a person who served in the
active military, naval, or air service and who was discharged or released under
conditions other than dishonorable.”) (emphasis in original).
245. See 38 C.F.R. pt. 4 (1999) (providing method to determine impairment in
earning capacity due to disability in order to calculate benefits to be paid).
246. See 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (1994) (setting forth basic entitlement rights for wartime
disability compensation); id. § 1131 (1994) (setting forth basic entitlement rights for
peacetime disability compensation).
247. See 38 U.S.C. § 1310 (1994) (stating that spouses and children of veterans
who die from service-connected disabilities shall be paid dependency and indemnity
compensation, so long as death occurred after December 31, 1956).
248. See 38 U.S.C. § 1521 (1994) (outlining pension entitlement of veterans who
served during wartime but are completely disabled from a non-service-connected
disability).
249. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 7104(a) (1994) (stating that the Board is to make final
decisions in appeals from Regional Office).
250. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1112(c) (1994) (establishing presumptions to be made
regarding diseases that are likely due to radiation exposure during wartime service).
251. Cf. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 231, at *53 (defining “law” as a rule of civil
conduct, “commanding what is right, and prohibiting what is wrong”), id. at *123
(noting that the second of the two types of “rights of persons” consists of “rights that
belong to him”).
252. See, e.g., 38 U.S.C. § 1159 (1994) (explaining that service connection for a
disability which has been in effect for more than ten years may not be severed unless
certain conditions are met); 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(c) (1999) (total rating may not be
reduced unless certain conditions met).
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In Akles v. Derwinski,253 the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
held that the Board’s failure to consider statutes and regulations
conferring a particular benefit, special monthly compensation,254 was
error even though the claimant never mentioned them.255 In the
opinion, the court repeatedly indicated that it was referring to
provisions that grant benefits.256 Some later cases could be read as
limiting Akles to the failure to apply benefit-granting provisions (i.e.
the third type of rule).257
It might be argued that rules that require agency action (the fifth
type of rule), such as scheduling a medical examination, are more
intrusive and are more costly in terms of agency resources than rules
that simply require an agency decision (the second through fourth
types of rules). Thus, it might be argued that not requiring issue
exhaustion for benefit-granting agency rules (which would only
require an agency decision), might be appropriate, but that issue
exhaustion should be required for rules that require agency action
that goes beyond the making of a decision.
However, because the agency is charged with administering both
benefit-granting rules and action-requiring rules, this may be too fine
a distinction. Both types of rules are within the agency’s area of
expertise or “skillfulness” and an appellate court should be able to
expect the agency to be familiar with them and apply them to the
extent they are implicated by the evidence of record and the
claimant’s testimony and argument.
d. Changing the settled “rules of the game”—“law-creating” and “lawdestroying” arguments
Appellate arguments can also be distinguished by whether they rely
on the settled “rules of the game”258 or whether they seek to change
253. 1 Vet. App. 118 (1991).
254. See 38 U.S.C. § 1114(k) (1994); 38 C.F.R. § 3.350 (1999) (describing special
monthly compensation for veterans who have suffered the anatomical loss or loss of
use of one or more body parts due to service-connected disability).
255. See Akles, 1 Vet. App. at 118 (holding that Secretary did not fulfill duty to
assist when special monthly compensation benefits may have been available).
256. See id. at 121 (“There is no requirement in the law that a veteran must specify
with precision the statutory provisions or the corresponding regulations under which
he is seeking benefits.”).
257. See, e.g., McGrath v. Brown, 5 Vet. App. 57, 60 (1993) (“The BVA cannot
ignore or reject a claim merely because the veteran did not expressly raise the
appropriate legal provision for the benefit sought.”); Magusin v. Derwinski, 2 Vet.
App. 547, 549 (1992) (“Instead, the VA has an affirmative duty to assist the veteran in
developing his claim by informing him that he may be eligible for benefits under a
particular provision.”).
258. Cf. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 32 n.6
(1997). The Court stated that:
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the rules.259 This Article will refer to arguments that seek to change
the settled rules as “law-creating” arguments and “law-destroying”
arguments.
By “law-creating,” this Article means an argument that a document
that otherwise would not be binding should be binding. This will
usually be an argument that an unpublished rule is a “substantive
rule” within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure Act and
thus has the force and effect of law.260 In veterans benefits appeals,
these arguments arise frequently in the context of the VA
Adjudication Procedure Manual, also known as Manual M21-1.261
By “law-destroying,” this Article means an argument that a statute,
regulation, or case that otherwise would be binding should not be
binding. This will usually be an argument that a statute or regulation
is unconstitutional on its face or as applied262 or that a regulation is
invalid because the agency failed to follow proper rulemaking
procedures. This term would also include an argument that a
binding precedent decision should be overruled.
This distinction—between “settled rules of the game” on the one
hand, and “law-creating” and “law-destroying” arguments on the
other—is related to the earlier distinction based on the type of legal
authority relied on. Most “law-creating” arguments will be based on a
claim that an unpublished rule is a “substantive rule” within the
meaning of the APA. Most “law-destroying” arguments will be based
either on the APA (failure to following APA rulemaking
requirements) or the Constitution (violation of some constitutional
provision, such as the Due Process Clause).263
To change so substantially the rules of the game [by adopting a bright-line
rule rather than a flexible rule regarding estoppel] now could very well
subvert the various balances the [Patent and Trademark Office] sought to
strike when issuing the numerous patents which have not yet expired and
which would be affected by our decision.
Id.
259. This Article does not include arguments for a broader or narrower
construction of a particular statute or regulation or case within this category.
260. See supra note 236 and accompanying text (discussing how those who wish to
rely on agency manuals or circulars as authority point to the Administrative
Procedure Act as authority for the argument).
261. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown, 10 Vet. App. 128 (1997) (adjudicating claim
concerning Manual M21-1 provisions regarding service connection for post-traumatic
stress disorder); Montalvo v. Brown, 7 Vet. App. 312, 314 (1995) (concluding that
agency circular providing that all beneficiaries would be “furnished” improved
pension election card required that election cards have been actually received, not
just mailed, was “substantive” and thus had “force and effect of law”).
262. See Richard ex rel. v. West, 161 F.3d 719, 723 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (arguing that
construing VA statute to compel the conclusion that a veteran’s claim to disability
compensation terminates at death violated procedural due process).
263. The terms “law-creating” and “law-destroying” are the author’s. Other
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Because these law-creating and law-destroying arguments seek a
more drastic remedy from the court—changing the law rather than
simply applying the settled law—issue exhaustion should be required
for those arguments. Requiring issue exhaustion for those arguments
would allow the agency to have input on the issue, and would result
in a better record for appeal. A decision as to whether to change the
law should be more carefully considered than one simply applying
settled law. Requiring issue exhaustion may avoid an “improvident or
ill-advised” opinion by giving the court the benefit of the agency’s
decision.264 Although the agency should be expected to apply the
settled rules applicable to its area of administration, it should not be
expected to, sua sponte, seek to change those rules.
In other areas of law, there are many procedural hoops to jump
through when a change in the law is proposed—whether that change
is an amendment to a statute, a change in a regulation, or
overturning a precedential decision.265 Requiring issue exhaustion
when a change in the law is proposed in the context of a veterans
benefits appeal would be consistent with these procedural
requirements.
In veterans benefits cases, law-creating and law-destroying
arguments would likely relate to provisions that would potentially
authors have used similar terms, but in a different sense. Cf. John W. Poulos, The
Judicial Process and Substantive Criminal Law: The Legacy of Roger Traynor, 29 L OY. L.A.
L. REV. 429, 515 (1996) (noting that Justice Traynor apparently relied on an excerpt
from one case as part of the rationale for “summarily rejecting the law-creating
argument” in another case); Note, The Faith to Change: Reconciling the Oath to Uphold
with the Power to Amend, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1757 (1996) (“Oath-takers must be
committed to the ideal of the publicly regulated and validated text. They need to
have a constitutional faith that reflects both the benign (law creating/constitutive)
and fearful (law destroying/revolutionary) aspects of the popular sovereign, ‘We, the
People.’”); Andrew L. Shapiro, Constitutional Issues Involving Use of the Internet: The
Disappearance of Cyberspace and the Rise of the Code, 8 SETON HALL C ONST. L.J. 703, 720 &
n.49 (1998) (referring to “Robert Cover’s concept of certain activities being
‘jurisgenerative’ (law making) or ‘jurispathic’ (law destroying)”) (citing Robert M.
Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983)).
264. Cf. Carbino v. West, 168 F.3d 32, 35 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The court noted that
As the Tenth Circuit put it, permitting an appellant to raise new arguments
in a reply brief “would be unfair to the court itself, which without the benefit
of a response from appellee to an appellant’s late-blooming argument,
would run the risk ‘of an improvident or ill-advised opinion, given [the
court’s] dependence . . . on the adversarial process for sharpening the issues
for decision.’”
Id.
265. See U.S. CONST., art. I, ' 7 (procedures for enacting federal statutes); 5 U.S.C.
' 553 (1994) (procedures for promulgating federal regulations); see also Vas-Cath,
Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[D]ecisions of a three-judge
panel of this court cannot overturn prior precedential decisions.”); Bethea v.
Derwininski, 2 Vet. App. 252, 254 (1992) (“Only the en banc Court may overturn a
panel decision.”).
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affect a large number of claimants. Thus, even if one claimant were
barred from making such an argument on the grounds of failure to
raise the issue before the agency, it is likely that another claimant
would raise the issue. So it is doubtful that such an issue would evade
review by the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims for very long.
CONCLUSION
Agency-level proceedings in veterans benefits cases are
nonadversarial, but appellate review of those decisions is adversarial.
There is tension and conflict between the goals and assumptions of
the nonadversarial and adversarial systems. The case law from the
Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims and the Federal Circuit reflects
this conflict. Some cases emphasize the nonadversarial nature of
agency proceedings and do not require issue exhaustion. Others
emphasize the adversarial nature of appellate review of the agency’s
decisions and do require issue exhaustion.
In approaching this problem, courts have a number of options.
One option is to ignore the nonadversarial nature of the agency
proceedings and require issue exhaustion for all issues. A second
option is to ignore the adversarial nature of appellate review, as well
as the error-correcting function of appellate courts, and not require
issue exhaustion for any issue. A third option is to try to balance the
competing and often conflicting goals of the veterans benefits
appeals process, and require issue exhaustion for some issues but not
others. This approach would recognize that the United States Court
of Appeals for Veterans Claims is both a court “of appeals” and a
court “for veterans claims.”
In striking a balance, a rule-based approach is more principled and
predictable than a case-by-case balancing approach. The starting
point in finding a rule to apply should be to consider the nature of
an appellate court and what an appellate court may reasonably
expect from the agency decisionmaker. In other words, what sort of
“skillfulness” should the reviewing court expect from “those who
adjudicate” veterans benefits claims? In answering that question, the
reviewing court should consider what the agency should have
decided, given the evidence and argument before it at the time of the
decision, and the agency-specific statutory, regulatory, and case law in
existence at that time. In other words, the agency’s decision should
be judged in light of the record, the settled law the agency is charged
with administering, and the claimant’s argument and testimony up to
the time of the decision. This approach is consistent with the Federal
Circuit’s holding that it would only consider issues that the Court of
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Appeals for Veterans Claims did decide or that the parties raised.266
If the argument made for the first time on appeal is based on the
record before the agency decisionmaker and the settled agencyspecific laws and regulations, issue exhaustion should not be
required. Any arguments that go beyond this, however, would
require the agency to predict whatever the imagination of counsel
could dream up. Thus, if the argument is based on statutes or
regulations the agency is not charged with administering, or seeks to
change the settled rules applicable to the agency, then issue
exhaustion should be required.

266. See Belcher, 214 F.3d at 1337.

